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Dam Complications in Senegal: How River Dams May Hurt More
Than Help Vulnerable Populations in Water-stressed Regions
Colleen Diessner*
Much of the alarm over global climate change and variability
("CCV") concerns how CCV impacts generate shortages of food and
water resources, particularly in developing regions of the world, where
populations rely on direct access to natural resources.' Adaptation
measures to counter these CCV impacts include river dams, the
installment of which combat climate variability impacts of destructive
floods and droughts by controlling stream flow and transferring local
agricultural practices from floodplain recession to irrigation systems.2 But
the environmental repercussions of river dams are vast and can
significantly decrease local access to natural resources;3 halting natural
flood patterns is particularly trying for downstream communities who are
struggling financially with the economic transition to irrigated
M.A. Geography, University of Missouri.
'Mertz 0, et al., Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries, 43 ENVTL.
MGMT. 743, 758 (2008).
2 Barry Smit & Mark W. Skinner, Adaptation Options in Agriculture to Climate Change:
a Typology, 7 MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE 85, 99 (2002).
3 See generally Andre Desgeorges & B.K. Reilly, Dams and Large Scale Irrigation on
the Senegal River: Impacts on Man and the Environment, U.N. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT OFFICE (2006) available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/papers/DeGeorges%20Andre.pdf.
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agriculture.4 Political objectives and contention of governmental dam
commission members may also reverberate at a local scale, intensifying
stress on food and water resources for vulnerable communities.5 Through
examining one representative case: the social and environmental impacts
of the Manantali Dam on the Fuuta Tooro region of Northern Senegal, this
paper explores how river dams can significantly exacerbate vulnerability
to CCV impacts and political disputes over access to water, a resource that
is waning world-wide.
The Fuuta Tooro region is nestled within bordering Senegalese and
Mauritanian banks of the Senegal River, extending approximately from
Dagana to Matam. This region is part of the greater Senegal River Valley,
whose basin begins at the town Bakel, downstream from the source of the
Senegal River, the Guinean Fuuta Djalon Mountains.6 The basin stretches
from small Bakel to Saint Louis, covering about 350000 square km,
through which the river flows 800 km. Within the Senegal River Valley,
the Fuuta Tooro region marks ecotonal transition between arid desert in
Mauritania and semi-arid savanna in Senegal. In simpler terms, when
driving northeast from Senegal's coastal capital Dakar, when you
eventually reach a sandy region where even heat-tolerant Baobab trees
disappear, you have reached the Fuuta Tooro.
4 Nina L. Saarnak, Flood recession agriculture in the Senegal River Valley, 103(1)
DANISH J. GEOGRAPHY 99, 107 (2003).
5 See generally, Ron Parker, The Senegal-Mauritania conflict of 1989: a Fragile
Equilibrium, 29 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 155 (1991).
6 Saarnak, supra note 4, at 100.
'Id. at 101.
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Fuuta inhabitants are predominantly Pulaar, one sect of the
Sahelian Fulbe, who are historically nomadic and found in variegated
cultural pockets throughout the Sahel, range as far south as the Central
African Republic. By the mid 1700s, the Fuuta Tooro Pulaars had begun
establishing sedentary communities, avidly maintaining herding practices
while developing agricultural reliance along the Senegal River.8 Pulaar
culture is largely uniform throughout both sides of the Senegal-Mauritania
boundary and border traffic of Pulaars from either side of the river is
permeable .
I. CLIMATE NORMS AND PREDICTED CHANGES
The Fuuta Tooro's typical climate includes one rainy season from
late July to early September, each month bearing less than 100mm rainfall,
and even less in El Nino associated years.'o After a temperature rise in
September through early November, an annual cool season sets in mid
November till February, followed by the hottest season from March
through June, where the hot, dry climate generally ranges from 100 to 130
degrees Fahrenheit." These Sahelian climate conditions are not static,
8 David Robinson, The Islamic Revolution ofFuta Toro, 8 INT'L JOURNAL AFRICAN
HISTORICAL STUDIES 185-221 (1975).
9 Ron Parker, The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: a Fragile Equilibrium, 29 J.
MOD. AFRICAN STUDIES 155, 158 (1991).
to C. McSweeney, M. New, and G. Lizcano, UNDP Climate Change Profiles: Senegal,
http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/climate/projects/undpcp/UNDP reports/Senegal/Sene
gal.low res.report.pdf.
" WEATHERBUG, (July 29, 2012), http://www.weatherbug.com.
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however, and increasing trends in extreme weather have been linked with
anthropogenic causes.
While evolving contexts for desertification in arid regions undergo
continual debate,12 recent climate change trends in Senegal, whatever the
causes, are observable in mean annual rainfall.' 3 Significant decadal
decreases ranging from 10 to 15mm are documented for southern tropical
regions. In northern Senegal, however, long-term trends prove more
challenging to track because this region is more prone to drastic variability
over long periods of time. Any actual intense climate change is difficult to
align with any specific cause or process.14 Additionally, trends in daily
rainfall are indeterminable for lack of reliable data.' 5 Scientists are able,
however, through analyzing collective climate change knowledge, to
predict particular climate trends for variable arid regions like the Fuuta
Tooro and compare actual, current climate trends with these models in
order to suggest current climate trends are part of the global anthropogenic
climate change phenomenon. Such current projection models demonstrate
that while rainfall patterns vary greatly throughout Senegal, there is
noticeable predicted decline, especially for the rainy seasons in the Fuuta
Tooro.' 6 It is also important to note that while models predict decreased
annual precipitation for Senegal overall, they predict increased seasonal
variability and increased precipitation volume in heavy seasonal
12 See S.M. Herrmann & C.F. Hutchison, The Changing Contexts of the Desertification
Debate, 63 J. ARID ENv'Ts 538 (2005).
13 See McSweeney, supra note 10.
14 Id. at 3.
s Id. at 2.
16 Id.
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rainstorms,' 7 meaning that though less rain is falling, when it does fall, it
is increasingly catastrophic. The impact of these arid climate trends on
existing political tension surrounding the Fuuta Tooro is equally
calamitous.
II. DESERTIFICATION, APARTHEID, AND A DAM
In light of increased environmental stressors on natural water
resources, many recent studies investigating the potential for "water wars"
find that conflicts among riparian countries generally subside in
cooperative effort to share their water resources rather than engage in
violence.1 8 Such studies note, however, that in arid West Africa, demand
among growing populations for water resources increases potential for
future water conflicts. Specifically, because water resources are both
decreasing in amount and increasing in variability (i.e. rainfall is less
predictable and more destructive when it occurs), tensions arise among
riparian communities who must all increase reliance on shared and
dwindling rivers as sources for water.19 The racial hostility that surfaced
18 See Aaron T. Wolf, Shira B. Yoffe and Mark Giordano, International waters:
identifying basins at risk, 5 WATER POLICY 29 (2003) available at
http://www.environmental-expert.com/Files%5C5302%5Carticles%5C5877%5C2.pdf
'
9 Madiodio Niasse, Climate-Induced Water Conflict Risks in West Africa: Recognizing
and Coping with Increasing Climate Impacts on Shared Watercourses INTERNATIONAL
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in the Fuuta Tooro in the 1980s illustrates how conflict over water may
unfold.
Ethnic tension between Arab and black African Mauritanians dates
back before the eleventh century, when the fall of the Ghana empire
allowed "Beydane" Arabs to dominate and gradually enslave "Heratine"
Mauritanian blacks. 20 Arabic entitlement was therefore threatened when
colonizing France, whose conquest was based in Senegal, grouped
Mauritania's governmental administration and economy with Senegal's. 21
In 1946, Mauritania was politically separated from Senegal and in 1960,
when Mauritania became an established country, their ruling Beydane
regime promptly redistributed power to their own Arab population through
a variety of measures.22 Some of these apartheid policies include:
reducing the number of black Africans in governmental positions to 30%,
Arabicizing national education programs, deeming Arabic the official
national language, and simultaneously joining the Arab League while
withdrawing from the West African Monetary Union.23 Though slavery
was officially abolished in 1980, the Arab-master over black-slave
relationship is still embedded in Mauritanian culture, maintained in the
attitudes of Mauritanian citizens and in some rural areas, through
persevering slave policies. 24
20 Parker, supra note 5, at 156-157.
21 Id. at 156.
22 d. at 156-157.
231Id. at 157.
24 See generally, Parker, supra note 5.
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Severe drought struck the West African Sahel in the 1970's and
80's.25 Because the Beydane herders rely on rain-fed and floodplain
agriculture, the drought hit them hard and many herders became refugees,
their communities pushed further and further South into black African-
cultivated land along the Mauritanian bank of the Fuuta Tooro. In 1988
the Mauritanian government abolished traditional land-holding rights in
the Fuuta Tooro, distributing black African (mostly Pulaar and some
Soninke) agricultural plots along the Senegal River to Beydane herders.27
Beydanes receiving expropriated Pulaar fields also obtained investment
capital from the Mauritanian government to be applied for modern
irrigation farming.28 The Mauritanian government, an active member of
OMVS (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Senegal -the dam
commission for the Senegal River), was encouraging irrigation farming as
a subsequent development of the Manantali Dam, constructed upstream in
Mali in 198729. Any black farmers who protested or fought the
agricultural reforms were "imprisoned en masse", and many were killed.30
25 Parker, supra note 5, at 158.
26 id
27 Id. at 158-159.
28 See generally Parker, supra note 5.
29 Niasse, supra note 19, at 7.
30 Michael M. Horowitz, Victims Upstream and Down, 4 J. OF REFUGEE STUDIES, 164
(1991); see Parker, supra note 5.
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III. THE MANANTALI DAM
In 1972, the OMVS was formed with the objective of damming the
Senegal River in order to advance irrigation agriculture, hydrologic
energy, and navigation for transporting goods throughout the Senegal
River Valley.3 1 OMVS, representing hydrologic interests of government
officials in Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania, was created to replace the 1968
founded Organisation des Etats Riverains du Senegal (OERS) after Guinea
withdrew membership. 32 In 1972, the newly formed OMVS stated the
following goals:
1) "To provide a secure and steadily improving livelihood
for the inhabitants of the river basin and neighboring areas"
2) "To safeguard as far as possible the ecological balance
of the river basin"
3) "To make the economies of the three member states less
vulnerable to climatic conditions and external factors"
4) "To accelerate the economic development of the member
countries by the intensive promotion of regional
cooperation." 33
31 Peter Bosshard, A Case Study on the Manantali Dam Project, INT'L RIVERS (Mar. 1,
1999) available at http://www.intemationalrivers.org/resources/a-case-study-on-the-
manantali-dam-project-mali-mauritania-senegal-2011.
32 ADRIAN ADAMs, THE RIVER SENEGALO: FLOOD MANAGEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
THE VALLEYO 5 (2000), available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/7419H1ED.pdf.0 O O
33 Id. at 1-2.
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Despite avid warning against damming the Senegal River from
agronomists, economists, sociologists, and journalists, OMVS overlooked
this educated advice, as well as recommendations to consult with and
inform the river valley residents of the coming change in flow regime. 34
OMVS planned to build two dams -the Manantali dam on the Bafing
tributary in Mali and the Diama dam nearer to the river delta in Saint
Louis, Senegal, which was intended to retain ocean salt water from the
delta and lower valley for improved irrigation.3 5 The Manantali dam,
located upstream and bearing greater effect on the Fuuta Tooro study area,
will be the greater focus in this discussion.
Construction for the Manantali dam began in 1981 and was
completed in 1987, at which point all $500 million invested in the project
was spent, leaving nothing for the remaining power station and
navigational structuring of the river. (It should be noted that later in 1998,
Mauritanian OMVS high commissioner Baba Ould Sidi Abdallah was
arrested for illegally diverting funds.) 36 Manantali dam investors included
several Arab governments, the Islamic and the African Development
Banks, Italy, the French CFD, the German KfW, the Canadian CIDA and
the European Union. 37 Because of projected negative impacts, the World
Bank declined funding the dam, though they did contribute to a later
collection of funds allocated for the un-built power station; other
34 1d. at 2-3.
3s Id. at 2. The Diama dam was intended to retain ocean salt water from the delta and
lower valley for improved irrigation. Id.
36 Bosshard, supra note 32. It should be noted that later in 1998, Mauritanian OMVS
high commissioner Baba Ould Sidi Abdallah was arrested for illegally diverting funds.
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donations for the power station came from the French CFD, the German
KfW, the European Investment Bank and European Community, the Arab
Fund for Economic and Social Development, Canadian CIDA, the African
Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the West African
Development Bank, and the Nordic Development Bank.38 In 1997,
however, Norway withdrew plans to contribute to the power station out of
disapproval for the dam's severe health impacts on Senegal River Valley
inhabitants.39 But the drastically rising rates of malaria and
schistosomiasis were only one of many problems caused by the
construction of the Manantali dam. 40
After riparian land rights in Mauritania were redistributed to
Beydane herders, many of the expelled Pulaar farmers sought refuge
across the river, on the Senegalese side of the Fuuta Tooro. Pulaar
community leaders along the Senegal banks quickly became sensitive to
the injustice, organizing self-defense committees and declaring the
Mauritanian agricultural reform a national problem that concerns all
Senegalese and not only the workers of the river valley.41 The committees
rallied for fair land distribution and the continuation of allowing freely
trafficked goods and people to cross the border, measures that were simply
ignored by officials in both Nouakchott and Dakar. At the time, the
Senegalese government's apathy toward heightening tension in the Fuuta




41 Parker, supra note 5, at 159.
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compiling disputes in the Fuuta Tooro became an issue Dakar could no
longer overlook.42
The Manantali dam was officially closed in 1988. As the dam took
effect and the river lowered from adjacent floodplains, Senegalese farmers
drew in closer to the river and began receiving harassment from
Mauritanian border guards, who chased Senegalese farmers off their own
land.43 In November of 1988, Mauritanian camel herds were caught
violating grazing rights in Senegal and were ousted from the country.
Nouakchott officials consequently refused Senegalese trucks at the border,
inspiring Dakar officials to form a river blockade in the Senegalese border
town, Rosso. The following year, Dakar refused certain Mauritanian food
imports, like fresh fish and mineral water, stimulating Nouakchott's
embargoes on Senegalese vegetable oil, animal feed, and fresh vegetables.
Though this trade battle eased through a series of meetings coordinated by
the government of Cote d'Ivoire, on April 8, 1989 a violent skirmish
resulted after another Mauritanian herd was caught grazing on Senegalese
land, and in accordance with established grazing laws, the Senegalese land
owners captured and kept the herd. Two of these Senegalese men were
killed on April 8, and the other thirteen were taken under Mauritanian
custody." Failure of Nouakchott to seriously indulge Dakar's request for
investigation left Senegalese communities seething. From April 19-20,
villages along the Senegal River experienced violent outbreaks, rioters in
Dakar attacked Mauritanian shops and the Mauritanian embassy, stirring
rumors in Nouakchott that Arabs were being actively sought and killed in
Dakar. This was indeed not the case, but the following April 25 came to
be known as 'Black Tuesday' for the hundreds of Senegalese and black
42 Niasse, supra note 19, at 7; See Parker, supra note 5.
43 Niasse, supra note 19, at 7.
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Africans hunted and killed in Mauritania that day. At least fifty Arabs
were killed in Dakar during the resulting 'Mauritanian Hunt' from April
27-29. Foreign aid intervened to assist the 'mass exodus of refugees', as
some 75,000 Senegalese and 170,000 Mauritanians were documented as
45displaced from the massacre, not counting those citizens who did not
seek or receive foreign transport for repatriation, or the thousands of
Mauritanian blacks who were denied reentry to their country and deported
back to Senegal.46
Because the three main factors causing the 1989 conflict are
critically worsening, these being 1) climate change 2) historical animosity
between Mauritania and Senegal and 3) environmental impacts of the
Manantali dam, potential for future hostility has not subsided.
1) Climate change is predicted to increase damaging
measures through drought and rain variability.
2) Political violence against Pulaars in Mauritania
actually worsened after 1989, according to Amnesty
International, reporting "Extrajudicial executions, torture,
and the cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of villagers
has reached a very alarming level in the south of the
country.A7 Also, current Senegalese president, Abdoulaye
Wade has a major water diversion project on the
backburner. The Fossil Valleys Project (FVP) entails
45 Parker, supra note 5, at 160 .
46 Niasse, supra note 19, at 7;See generally Parker, supra note 5..
47 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SENEGAL VALLEY, 1
(2 Oct. 1990).
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diverting the dammed water from Manantali to Senegalese
fossil tributaries for agricultural use.48 Due to Mauritanian
protest, the FVP was not enacted, and when Wade brought
it up again in 2000, Mauritania swiftly prepared once again
ejecting Senegalese citizens from its borders. 49 Wade
responded by publicly assuring the project's dormancy,
-50
calming Mauritanian upset; suspicions certainly remain.
3) The Manantali Dam, despite an onslaught of
criticism and injurious ramifications, is not going
anywhere.si
Negative impacts of the Manantali tend to outweigh the benefits in
most investigative studies regarding both human and ecological well-
being. Aside from the fact that very little energy is actually produced by
the dam, most of which supplies OMVS capital cities, and aside from the
fact that the Senegal River is still today unfit for any navigational use, the
Manantali dam has also caused mass community displacement,
deforestation, groundwater and fishing depletion, rise in water-cultivated
diseases, and discontinuation of sustainable agricultural practices. 52 All of
these problems affect the downstream Fuuta Tooro region
48 ADAMS, supra note 33, at 16.
49 Niasse, supra note 19, at 7.
50 Id.
s1 ADAMS, supra note 33, at 28.
52 See Desgeorges and Reilly, supra note 3, at 636-37, 640, 642.
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At the actual Manantali site in Mali, some 12,000 Malinke citizens
were forced out to make way for the reservoir. 53 Downstream in the
Fuuta, tracking relocation proves more difficult, due the number of
contributing causes, such as the political battles (incorporating
Mauritanian genocide) over agriculture discussed earlier; the irrigated land
reformations in Mauritania and the depleting water levels in the river were
both due to the Manantali dam and created over 170,000 refugees.54 But
there are also less political causes for relocation.
Damming a river "regulates" floodwaters and in doing so
suppresses the seasonal cycle, disrupting and depleting groundwater
aquifers, endangering downstream forests. 5 The most prevalent tree
species, acacia nilotica, used for firewood, charcoal, construction, and
grazing, depends on these affected aquifers, which are now diminishing. 56
There is added concern that if Mauritanian refugees relocated to the
Senegal bank of the Fuuta Tooro become too concentrated in areas or if
care is not continually taken to ensure provisions of woodland resources,
increased demand could exacerbate deforestation problems. Like the
native trees, many fish populations are also dependent on natural
fluctuations and sedimentary composition of ground water and
floodwaters; their numbers have also greatly reduced.5 Changing
salinization levels and flow rates permitted the invasion of certain water
53 Bosshard, supra note 32.
54 See Niasse, supra note 19, at 7.
5 Bosshard, supra note 32.
56 Horowitz, supra note 30, at 185.
5 Richard Black & Mohamed Sessay, Refugees, Land Cover, and Environmental Change
in the Senegal River Valley, 41 GEOJOURNAL 55, 65 (1997).
58 See Desgeorges and Reilly, supra note 3, at 638.
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plants, such as Sylvinia molesta and Pistia stratiotes, further disturbing
ecological stability, specifically fish reproduction, consequently harming
village-scale fishing practices.59 These changing riverbank conditions
have nurtured conditions for malaria and schistosomiasis vectors,
drastically raising disease rates among riverine communities. Nutrition
is another health issue. It is no secret that OMVS plans to switch natural
flood-recession agricultural practices to irrigation reliance permanently.61
Not only does the irrigation crop, rice, have lower nutritional value than
traditional sorghum and millet used in flood recession fields, 62 but
irrigation also increases soil depletion, requires high capitol investment
unaffordable for many villagers, and limits individual control and
management of villagers in their food production.63 Irrigation does
produce high crop yields more consistently, but flood recession agriculture
is still an important supplementary food source (and primary for many
villagers and communities) in the Fuuta Tooro.64 OMVS also does not
hide prioritizing hydroelectric production of the Manantali reservoir,
requiring constant flow through the turbines and discouraging supplying
water for flood recession purposes. Even when the reservoir is full
59 M Mietton et. al., Water Management in the Senegal River Delta: A Continuing
Uncertainty. 4 HYDROLOGY EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCES DISCUSSIONS 4297, 4303 (2007)
available at http://www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci-discuss.net/4/4297/2007/hessd-4-4297-
2007-print.pdf.
60 V.R. Southgate et al., Studies on the Biology ofSchistosomiasis With Emphasis on the
Senegal River Basin, 96 MEMORIAS INSTITUTO OSWALDO CRUZ SUPP. 75, 75 (2001),
available at http://www.scielo.br/pdf/mioc/v96s0/28x.pdf.
61 ADAMS, supra note 33, at 9.
62 Bosshard, supra note 32.
63 Saarnak, supra note 4, at 109-110.
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enough to provide for both purposes, the dam managers do not supply
adequate floods for traditional farming downstream. 65 Dam management
also fails to decrease flood risk, as unwanted floods continue and the
potential for flood disaster remains.66 Flood risk is exacerbated by the
reputation of OMVS for failing to notify river valley residents of any
water resource or flood conditions. 67
Life in the Fuuta Tooro has never been easy; indeed the natural
climate variability and flood patterns are fairly disobliging for sustainable
living,68 and CCV projections heighten this situation. The installment of
the Manantali has hardly fixed any of these climatic challenges, and with
the exception of a case made for irrigated agriculture, has actually made
water struggles in the Fuuta Tooro more challenging. "This wholly
human-wrought environment can be considered as a learning experience",
as increasing Fuuta Tooro residents are forced to relocate due to damaged
habitat conditions that can no longer sustain their livelihood.69
IV. SUMMARY
It is clear that Senegal and Mauritania face considerable obstacles
toward effective, humane water resource management, and that this
weighs heavily on the Fuuta Tooro communities who rely on safe,
affordable, and reliable access to water and water-affected resources.
Fuuta Tooro residents must cope with increasingly stressful climate
65 ADAMS, supra note 33, at 24.
6 M. Mietton et al., supra note 62, at 4304.
67 Desgeorges and Reilly, supra note 3, at 11.
68 M. Mietton et al., supra note 62, at 4298.
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conditions, ever-present political tension, and damaging impacts of costly
river dams that continually threaten local well being. The strength and
endurance exhibited by the Pulaar community in the Fuuta Tooro are
nothing short of admirable. Sociopolitical interference and
unaccommodating environment aside,7o Pulaar population and culture
have persevered through nomadic and sedentary lifestyles. The term
water crisis is used frequently today for water-stressed regions that are
vulnerable to climate change, like the Fuuta Tooro. Yet this term seems
somewhat unfitting for a region whose very existence is defined by arid
conditions. It is rather the potential for sociopolitical stressors, such as the
anthropogenic forces of climate change and an ill-managed river dam,
which manipulate and exacerbate the given arid conditions to create an
increasingly unforgiving environment that defines the real water crisis in
the Fuuta Tooro. It is imperative that those considering river dams as a
means for CCV adaptation take these potential repercussions into account.
263
70 Saamak, supra note 4, at 111.
